Sociobiology, universal Darwinism and their transcendence: An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism, and their types of reductionism towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism

Based on a review of different Darwinian paradigms, particularly sociobiology, this work, both, historically and philosophically, develops a metaphysic of gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, and then criticises and transcends these Darwinian paradigms in order to achieve a truly evolutionary theory of evolution. Part I introduces essential aspects of current sociobiology as the original challenge to this investigation. The claim of some sociobiologists that ethics should become biologized in a gene-egoistic way, is shown to be tied to certain biological views, which ethically lead to problematic results. In part II a historical investigation into sociobiology and Darwinism in general provides us, as historical epistemology', with a deeper understanding of the structure and background of these approaches. Gene-Darwinism, which presently dominates sociobiology and is linked to Dawkins' selfish gene view of evolution, is compared to Darwin's Darwinism and the evolutionary' synthesis and becomes defined more strictly. An account of the external history of Darwinism and its subparadigms shows how cultural intellectual presuppositions, like Malthusianism or the Newtonian concept of the unchangeable laws of nature, also influenced biological theory' construction. In part III universal 'process-Darwinism' is elaborated based on the historical interaction of Darwinism with non-biological subject areas. Building blocks for this are found in psychology, the theory of science and economics. Additionally, a metaphysical argument for the universality of process- Darwinism, linked to Hume's and Popper's problem of induction, is proposed. In part IV gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are criticised. Gene-Darwinism—despite its merits—is challenged as being one-sided in advocating 'gene-atomism', 'germ-line reductionism' and 'process-monism'. My alternative proposals develop and try to unify different criticisms often found. In respect of gene-atomism I advocate a many-level approach, opposing the necessary radical selfishness of single genes. I develop the concept of higher-level genes, propose a concept of systemic selection, which may stabilise group properties, without relying on permanent group selection and extend the applicability of a certain group selectionist model generally to small open groups. Proposals of mine linked to the critique of germ-line reductionism are: 'exformation', phenotypes as evolutionary factors and a field theoretic understanding of causa formalis (resembling Aristotelian hylemorphism). Finally the process-monism of gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, if defined strictly, Darwinism in general is criticised. 1 argue that our ontology and ethics would be improved by replacing the Newtoman-Paleyian deist metaphor of an eternal and unchangeable law of nature, which lies at tire very heart of Darwinism, by a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution where new processes may gain a certain autonomy. All this results in a view that I call 'ecological idealism', which, although still very much based on Darwinism, clearly transcends a Darwinian world view

The tight coupling between category and causal learning

The main goal of the present research was to demonstrate the interaction between category and causal induction in causal model learning. We used a two-phase learning procedure in which learners were presented with learning input referring to two interconnected causal relations forming a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a common-cause model (Experiments 2a, b). One of the three events (i.e., the intermediate event of the chain, or the common cause) was presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars. Although participants were not provided with any feedback about category labels, they tended to induce categories in the first phase that maximized the predictability of their causes or effects. In the second causal learning phase, participants had the choice between transferring the newly learned categories from the first phase at the cost of suboptimal predictions, or they could induce a new set of optimally predictive categories for the second causal relation, but at the cost of proliferating different category schemes for the same set of events. It turned out that in all three experiments learners tended to transfer the categories entailed by the first causal relation to the second causal relation

Structural Bayesian Models of Conditionals

In the past decade the traditional falsificationist view of hypothesis-testing tasks, such as Wason’s selection task, has become criticized from a Bayesian perspective. In this report a normative extension of Oaksford’s and Chater’s (1994, 1998) influential Bayesian theory is proposed, that not only takes quantitative but also qualitative (structural) knowledge into account. In an experiment it is shown that humans appear to be sensitive to both the quantitative and the qualitative preconditions of the proposed normative models

A Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Gene-Darwinism and Universal Darwinism

Hardcover, 17x24Although Charles Darwin predicted that his theory “would give zest to [...] metaphysics,” even he would be astonished at the variety of paths his theory has in fact taken. This holds with regard to both gene-Darwinism, a purified Darwinian approach biologizing the social sciences, and process- Darwinism found in the disciplines of psychology, philosophy of science, and economics. Although Darwinism is often linked to highly confirmed biological theories, some of its interpretations seem to profit from tautological claims as well, where scientific reputation cloaks ideological usage. This book discusses central tenets of Darwinism historically as well as systematically, for example the history of different Darwinian paradigms, the units-of-selection debate, and the philosophical problem of induction as basis of metaphysical Darwinism. Crucially the book addresses the Darwinian claim that evolution is governed by an immutable and unrelentingly cruel law of natural selection. Paradoxically, Darwin’s theory is a static, non-evolutionary theory of evolution. The current book sketches the historical background and provides suggestions that may help to replace this approach by the idea of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms (see Escher’s “Drawing Hands” on the cover). This view even suggests a tendency to overcome the blindness of the knowledge acquisition of primordial Darwinian processes and allows for some freedom from external environments. This book first develops a radically Darwinian approach, then criticises this approach from within. Even Darwinism has a tendency to transcend itself. Although the book addresses several empirical issues, it does not challenge particular findings. Instead it builds on many insights of Darwinism and provides a proposal for interpreting known empirical evidence in a different light. It should help pave the way for further developing an understanding of nature that transcends Darwinian metaphysics

On a General Bayesian Pattern Logic of Frequency-Based Logical Inclusion Fallacies

Bayesian logic provides a rational model of probability judgments deviating from the standard extensional norm of extensional probability. It formalizes the general idea of an inductive pattern logic that may resolve paradoxes of inclusion. Bayesian logic predicts that it should be possible to generalize the phenomenon of frequency-based logical conjunction fallacies to a system of logical inclusion fallacies. In Experiment 1 quantitative conditions for conjunction fallacies and the role of negations are investigated. Experiment 2 provides a first test of the postulated more general system of logical inclusion fallacies. The results of both experiments confirmed the proposed pattern logic and its formalization as Bayesian logic. Other theories of the conjunction fallacy cannot readily explain this class of frequency-based and pattern-based inclusion fallacies. Whether there are simpler heuristics that may perhaps explain these data as well should be investigated in the future

Eine Erklärung von Inhaltseffekten in der Wasonschen Wahlaufgabe

Die Wasonsche Informationswahlaufgabe (WST) ließ fundamentale Zweifel an der Rationalität menschlichen Hypothesentestens aufkommen und inspirierte die Entwicklung sowohl domänenspezifischer als auch domänenübergreifender Theorien des Denkens. In dieser Arbeit wird ein Synthesevorschlag entwickelt, der auf der einen Seite domänenspezifisch ist, auf der anderen Seite aber einen rationalen Ansatz darstellt. Um Anomalien in der WST-Debatte erklären zu können, wird dabei zwischen dem Prüfen deskriptiver und präskriptiver Aussagen unterschieden. Für das Prüfen deskriptiver Aussagen wird eine flexible Bayessche Logik entwickelt, die im Gegensatz zum falsifikationistischen Forschungsprogramm steht und auf vorangehende bayessche Ansätze (insbesondere auf Oaksford und Chater, 1994, 2003) aufbaut. Statt eines universellen Bayesschen Ansatzes wird ein wissensbasierter Ansatz vertreten, der die negativen Resultate früherer Forschung erklären könnte. Zudem wird der Bayessche Ansatz von Konditionalen auf andere logische Junktoren übertragen. Für die Testung präskriptiver Konditionalaussagen wird eine flexible deontische Logik vorgeschlagen. Diese umfaßt eine deontischen Logik von Verpflichtungen, Erlaubnissen und auch Verboten, die mit einem zielabhängigen, aber systematischen, Mechanismus der Cheater- und Cooperator-Detection kombiniert wird. In zwölf Experimenten konnten die meisten Vorhersagen des Ansatzes bestätigt werden. In zwei Experimenten wurde der Unterschied des Prüfens deskriptiver und präskriptiver Aussagen untersucht. In sieben Experimenten konnte der Bayessche Ansatz bestätigt werden, indem die Modellvoraussetzungen in der Instruktion absichtlich induziert wurden. Zudem wurden erste Evidenzen für unterschiedliche Effekte verschiedener Bayesianischer Modelle und für eine Bayessche Logik des Hypothesentestens vorgelegt. In drei Experi¬menten wurde die deontische Logik präskriptiver Aussagen und ihre Interaktion mit den Zielen Cheater oder Cooperator Detection (auch mit Doppelfokus) untersucht. Die Ergebnisse können nicht von anderen Theorien des WST (wie der Mental Model Theorie, der Social Contract Theory oder der Pragmatic Reasoning Schema Theorie) erklärt werden, sondern machen zumindest deren Erweiterung notwendig. Die Ergebnisse stützen den hier vertretenen Ansatz einer flexiblen bayesschen und deontischen Logik des Testens deskriptiver und präskriptiver Aussagen